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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to evaluate the feasibility 
of population control in a democratizing developing world. The 
extent to which past population control initiatives have 
relied upon coercive measures to achieve program targets is 
taken to have implications for the future of population 
planning in a democratizing developing world. The urgency of 
discerning the relationship between the independent variable 
of coercion and the dependent variable of population control 
is underscored by a discussion of the evidence for imminent 
population-driven political, economic, and ecological 
disruptions.
The three main theoretical frameworks of development 
studies, institutional, cultural, and dependency/Marxist, are 
examined for implications pertaining to the relationship 
between coercion and population control. These basic 
frameworks are found to explicitly expect or tacitly imply a 
role for political coercion in achieving population targets, 
suggesting difficulty for maximizing the goals of population 
control and democratization concurrently.
Analyses of population policy in India, China, Thailand, 
and Japan, however, demonstrate that population control may be 
achieved in an urbanizing and industrializing state through 
strictly voluntary means, given long-term and consistent 
governmental commitment to a comprehensive strategy for 
reducing births and improving the status of women. This 
finding, derived from time series data on population growth 
rates, fertility rates, urbanization rates, and female 
educational indicators, bodes well for the prospects of 
population control in a democratizing developing world. 
Further examination of the cases, though, illustrates that the 
independent variables of urbanization/industrialization and 
female empowerment influence population growth rates and 
fertility rates in the longer term, while coercive policy 
measures have utility for realizing rapid and notable 
reductions in these indicators. Nevertheless, the case data 
also suggest that in addition to the difficulties a coercive 
strategy will encounter in a democratizing environment, 
coercion may also be impracticable as a long-term or permanent 
strategy.
v
THE ROLE OF COERCION IN POPULATION PLANNING: 
THE EVIDENCE FROM FOUR ASIAN STATES
Population issues have returned to prominence on the 
international agenda, as seen in Cairo last summer. Population 
planning has attained this newfound prominence, however, in an 
era of profound political transformations. The march of modern 
information technology and the seeming triumph of Western 
socio-political arrangements in the international system 
suggest that authoritarian political institutions and 
practices are increasingly untenable in the modern world. In 
this analysis, I address the question of whether the 
resolution of the global population problem will be hindered 
by the ascendancy of democratic values in the post-Cold War 
international system. Toward this end, I will be examining the 
extent to which successful population control initiatives in 
China, India, Thailand, and Japan have hinged upon using 
coercive tactics to achieve population targets. By using 
qualitative and quantitative data, I will ascertain the extent 
to which an independent variable, political coercion, 
determined population growth rates and fertility rates.1 
Consideration will also be given to other independent
hereafter the independent variable "political coercion" 
(or more generally, "coercion") is taken to refer to such 
authoritarian tactics as involuntary sterilization, mandatory 
abortion, and "recruitment" of individuals for family planning 
measures through forcible roundups or raids. The presence of 
any one of these phenomena, or more, is taken to be "political 
coercion" for the purposes of this analysis.
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variables (such as urbanization, structural characteristics of 
the population programs, and empowerment of the female 
population) that could affect population indicators.
The forces of democratization, of course, make coercion 
a less viable strategy for controlling population numbers in 
any state. While the data indicate that coercion has been— at 
the least— a sufficient condition for dramatic short-term 
decreases in population growth rates, they also suggest that 
states can have both democratic institutions and reap the 
benefits of population planning, if several conditions hold. 
The case analyses which I examine suggest that the population 
bomb may be defused voluntarily in an urbanizing state, given 
a consistent and long-term governmental commitment to (1) 
population planning and (2) improving the status of women. 
Indeed, given population momentum and the apparent time 
requirements of success with voluntary measures, I venture to 
suggest that a cautionary note is in order for those who hold 
unrealistic expectations about voluntary measures as a "quick 
fix" for the population problem. Finally, although coercive 
measures are found to have practical effect in attaining rapid 
reductions in population growth rates and fertility rates, 
consideration will also be given to the possible limitations 
of using coercion to achieve program targets. Coercion, it is 
found, may be an unsustainable practice over the longer term, 
even if one sets aside the normative issues of democratiza­
tion.
4Malthus: Nov more than Ever 
Why population control become such a salient policy area? 
Alarm about population growth rates stems from evidence that 
the world has unwittingly stepped into a modern-day Malthusian 
Trap. Many of today's events appear to confirm a logic first 
put forward by the English economist Thomas Robert Malthus at 
the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries:
Assuming, then, my postulata granted, I say, 
that the power of population is indefinitely 
greater than the power in the earth to produce 
subsistence for man.
Population, when unchecked, increases in a 
geometrical ratio. Subsistence increases only in an 
arithmetical ratio. A slight acquaintance with the 
numbers will show the immensity of the first power 
over the second.
By the law of our nature which makes food 
necessary to the life of man, the effects of these 
two unequal powers must be kept equal.
This implies a strong and constantly operating 
check on population from the difficulty of 
subsistence. The difficulty must fall some where, 
and must necessarily be felt by a large 
portion of mankind. . .2
Should no preventive strategies be enacted to control 
population growth (namely, self-control and delayed marriage) , 
Malthus argued that "positive checks" of warfare, famine, and 
disease would place limits on population numbers. Other social 
scientists and analysts of the population question have 
derided the mathematics that undergird this argument. Indeed, 
the history of his own era might suggest that Malthus was a 
crank: in the nineteenth century, improvements in
2Thomas Malthus, An Essav On the Principle of Population. 
World's Classics Series (New York, New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1993), 13.
5transportation, agriculture, and the development of the New 
World yielded an increased food supply.3 No "positive checks” 
emerged to place limits on population numbers. Nor were any 
needed.
Yet it may be in our own era— at the cusp of the 
millennia and toward the middle of the next century— that we 
see the Malthusian logic, however unfortunately, validated. 
The independent variable behind many of our current 
ecological, political, and economic dilemmas seems to be 
population numbers, just as the Rev. Malthus would have 
maintained.
According to the intellectual heirs of Malthus, the 
problems that correlate with ever-increasing population go 
beyond warfare, famine, and disease. The neo-Malthur.ian 
argument now encompasses the additional issues of mineral 
resource scarcity, unprecedented environmental degradation, 
the sustainability of development in the Third World, and 
(possibly) the sustainability of industrial civilization on 
Earth. Some argue that the modern Malthusian arguments are no 
more tenable in our era than Malthus1 were in his own time. In 
looking at the numbers, however, I doubt anyone— social 
scientist, politician, "man in the street"— can argue 
convincingly that the world's current population growth rate, 
if unchecked, will produce no noticeable effects on life on
3Rondo Cameron, A Concise Economic History of' the World 
(New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 192.
Earth. Instead, I argue that while the scope of the effects of 
rapid population growth may be open to debate, even the 
possibility of major disruptions is enough to make one 
question whether ignoring population growth is an intelligent 
strategy.
The Population Bomb; Ticking Louder Still...
In 1800, world population had just surpassed one billion 
people. Between 1800 and the Great Depression (13 0 years), 
this figure doubled. By 1992 (a short sixty-three years 
later) , there were 5.5 billion people on Earth. At the turn of 
the millennia the Earth will be supporting 6.4 billion human 
beings. Most demographic extrapolations predict a 2100 world 
population somewhere between 7.5 and 14.2 billion.4
The lower-bound projection may not be alarming to the 
unconvinced, as it anticipates only an additional 2.0 billion 
people between now and 2100. The upper-bound projection, 
however, might disturb many of those skeptics unfazed by the 
lower-bound figures. Even they might have to admit that the 
effects of an additional 7.8 billion people placing demands 
upon the Earth's resource base by 2100 is cause for concern, 
as 7.8 billion is more people than currently inhabit the 
Earth.
4Thomas W. Merrick with Staff of the Population Reference 
Bureau, "World Population in Transition," Pooulatibn Bulletin 
Volume 41 Number 2 (April 1986), 14.
7This more than doubling of the Earth's population could 
have catastrophic effects. Particularly disturbing is the 
possibility that these effects might mutually reinforce each 
other, creating a doomsday spiral of neo-Malthusian horrors: 
it is entirely possible that we may live to see an 
increasingly hungry, diseased, and volatile (both ecologically 
and politically) world. The developed world might be able to 
ignore the early symptoms of the population crisis, which may 
appear first in the developing world. Early symptoms of what 
is to come conceivably include a massive expansion of 
atmospheric pollution from the burning of fossil fuels, 
skyrocketing reports of AIDS (accompanied by other, "older" 
plagues), and a prevalence of famine from the farming of 
unsustainable land. Yet, in an interdependent world, few or 
none of these problems will be contained by traditional state 
borders. To bank on fertilizers (with their own negative side 
effects), miracle vaccines, and alternative energy sources 
(plausible in the developed world, less so for the developing 
world), and other technological quick-fixes of "progress" 
(i.e., space colonization) to solve population-driven crises 
seems innocent, given the magnitude of the population growth 
discussed above. Costs to political systems could be huge, and 
we might expect to see more unprecedented political problems 
arise. For instance, what happens in a world of 15 billion 
when a state devastated by population-related ills (shortages, 
famine, disease, little sustainable land) holds in its hands
a nuclear card? A worOld of 15 billion would probably have a 
much more tumultuous political environment— even if it never 
comes to nuclear blackmail.
Democracy1s Ascendancy 
If these phenomena are population-driven, then the 
obvious solution is to control population numbers. At the 
macro level, the international system has a stake in warding 
off global crisis. On the other hand, the constituent states 
of the international system— particularly those of the 
developing world— have other motivations to contain population 
growth. Third World states often find that population-driven 
ills (resource shortages, famine, disease) undercut gains that 
would otherwise be realized in economic and social 
development. Indeed, the goals of economic and social 
development have been the primary motivations to enact 
population planning policies in the four states considered 
here.
While population momentum presses the developing world, 
so too does the ideological force of democratization. Since 
the fall of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of Communist regimes 
in Eastern Europe and the eventual disintegration of the 
Soviet Union into a "Commonwealth of Independent States," 
democracy (with its ubiquitous companion, the free market) has 
emerged as the predominant political paradigm. Of course, the 
discrediting of centrally-planned and authoritarian models of
9governance has not meant an easy and immediate worldwide 
transition to democracy and open markets. Nevertheless, an 
increasing number of actors now evaluate the worth of 
political systems— and political leaderships— using democracy 
and open markets as the basic standards of judgement.
Thus the looming population question discussed above has 
been inherited by Third World governments that are 
increasingly pressured— by their own citizens, by other 
states, by interdependence itself— to adopt the liberal norms 
of Western political arrangements. If the success of these 
population programs in the past has hinged upon the use of 
coercive tactics to meet program targets, then the Third World 
states of today, influenced by a democratizing environment, 
may have difficulty in controlling their population growth. 
Furthermore, if coercion has been a critical ingredient of the 
population policies of these states, then defusing the global 
population bomb in a democratizing environment will be 
difficult.
Coercion. Population Planning, and the 
Development Literature
Population control is essentially a development issue, 
and development, of course, has been a major preoccupation of 
policy-makers and the discipline of comparative politics since 
the end of World War II. Indeed, the emergence of Third World 
and the Warsaw Pact states rattled some of the latent 
assumptions of the comparative discipline. Prior to the post-
10
War era, comparative politics had remained largely a 
descriptive, normative, and legalistic endeavor.5 As such, 
many of the tools comparativists had used (e.g., studying 
constitutions, legislatures) to analyze political systems were 
not helpful in assessing the question of development.
Three main arguments, or groups of arguments, may be 
discerned in the post-War literature on Third World 
development. Instead of examining the merits of the three as 
theory, I am content to discern what the arguments imply about 
the role of political coercion in population control: inasmuch 
as they speak to the issue of population planning, do they 
suggest that political coercion will be a necessary or 
sufficient precondition for controlling population growth in 
the developing world? If the main frameworks of development 
studies persuade one to expect that population control will be 
accompanied by coercion, then one has more reason to expect 
difficulties in controlling population growth in today*s 
democratizing world. The three approaches to the development 
questions considered here are the institutional, cultural, and 
dependency/Marxist arguments.
5Lawrence C. Mayer, Redefining Comparative Politics: 
Promise Versus Performance. Volume 173, Sage Library of Social 
Research Series (Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publicatibns, 1989), 
67.
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Institutions
As advanced by Samuel P. Huntington, the institutional 
argument speaks mainly to political development, which is not 
to be confused (in this case) with democratization. For him, 
the key concept is mobilization, in which the politically 
relevant strata of a state*s population expands greatly. 
Increased mobilization walks hand-in-hand with modernization, 
which brings a developing state higher literacy rates, 
increased exposure to mass media, and increased urbanization. 
A modernizing society thus produces a mobilized populace? the 
number and sophistication of those who make demands upon 
political institutions multiplies. The danger to a modernizing 
society is that this increasingly-mobilized populace will 
overwhelm fragile political institutions with demands for 
scarce resources and services. This, in turn, produces a 
situation of political decay rather than political 
development. Political development is the converse, equated, 
of course, with strong, adaptable institutions.6
Taking steps to decrease mobilization while building 
strong institutions is one way out of this dilemma. Such steps 
could include limiting mass communication or discouraging 
competition among groups, as was done in developing states 
such as Singapore and South Korea. However, this itself 
suggests that Huntington's fundamental concern is to maximize
6Please see Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in 
Changing Societies (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale 'University 
Press, 1968).
12
order. Order, from the perspective of this argument is the 
main precondition to any kind of development, whether 
political or economic.
Thus the institutional argument about Third World 
development does not speak directly to the issue of 
controlling population numbers, nor to the necessity of 
coercion. When considered, though, the Huntingtonian logic 
would allow that population control is, in fact, a most 
extreme measure for dealing with the modernization- 
mobilization crisis. If modernization brings mobilization, 
which left unchecked strains the capacities of weak political 
institutions, then a restrictive population policy is the most 
comprehensive means to limit the number of potential demand- 
makers in a ^tate. If the economy may be grown and 
institutions strengthened over time, both would be less likely 
overtaken . by a mobilized citizenry: there would be fewer
people, and thus fewer mobilized people.
Thus one sees that the institutional logic allows a role 
for population planning, even though Huntington does not 
address the issue directly. It is also silent on the issue of 
coercion, but given the institutional logic*s fundamental 
concern with order over "justice," it cannot be said to 
disallow coercive measures if population control would assist 
in slowing mobilization.7 On the other hand, if coercive
7Huntington readily admits his partiality for "political 
stability," or order, in his Preface. Please see Huntington, 
vii.
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measures would increase discontent, demand-making, and 
disorder, then this logic would suggest that they are
3
* counterproductive.
Culture
Like the institutional approach, a cultural approach to 
the development question suggests that Third World states have 
challenges along the path to development. In this view, 
however, the determinative factor is the shared cultural 
traits, norms, and values found among the people who reside in 
a state or a region.
Christopher Clapham argues that what links the states 
of the Third World is their neopatrimonial culture, in which 
rational-legal structures inherited from a colonial power 
overlay a grid of lord-vassal relationships from a traditional 
patrimonial system. The result is a patron-client state where 
corruption and patronage are endemic, making allocations of 
resources inefficient (e.g. , the road goes to the wrong 
place). This behavior is accepted by the neopatrimonial 
culture and "condemned only so far in as it benefits someone 
else rather than oneself."8 Culture is also advanced by 
Lawrence E. Harrison as the main explanation for 
underdevelopment. Though he concentrates on Latin America, he
8Christopher Clapham, Third World Politics: An
Introduction (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin
Press, 1985), 49.
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notes how the cultural argument may be applied to other 
regions as well.9 The traditional Latin American culture, 
Harrison wants to prove, creates an inertia that makes 
development difficult. He argues that the states in Latin 
America that escaped mainstream Latin American culture through 
historical and cultural circumstance are also the most 
"developed" according to important economic and social 
indicators. The states that did not escape that culture have 
a laundry-list of traits (he's careful not to say 
deficiencies) that retard development, including several that 
resemble conceptually Clapham's understanding of 
neopatrimonialism.10
As argued by these comparative scholars, the cultural 
logic (as with the institutional one above) does not speak 
directly to the issue of population planning. Both analysts 
emphasize particular cultural traits that must be overcome in 
order to achieve "development." Yet by locating the explicans 
in culture, the cultural logic touches upon a critical issue 
in population planning. Population control policies in China 
and India, for instance, have been paired with extensive 
socialization efforts designed to inculcate a new set of 
values. In doing so, the Indian and Chinese governments are
9Please see Lawrence E. Harrison, Underdevelopment is a 
State of Mind (Lanham, Maryland: The Harvard University Center 
for International Affairs and the University Press of America, 
1985).
10Ibid, 146.
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attempting to overcome the cultural inertia that permits or 
often values large families.
Thus, on the subject of population planning, a cultural 
logic does not exclude the possibility that the value placed 
upon large families is another development-hindering cultural 
trait. Furthermore, by positing causality in culture, which 
should normally be resistant to easy manipulation, the 
cultural argument anticipates a role for political coercion in 
achieving targets set by a population plan.
Dependency and Marxist Arguments
The dependency argument has a lineage that extends back 
to the Marxist-Leninist critique of international politics. 
Furthermore, the forefathers of this approach, Marx and Engels 
had some very choice criticisms reserved for Malthus, whom 
they regarded as a bourgeois sycophant.11
The dependency logic suggests (true to its heritage) 
that development in the Third World is made impossible given 
that states there are systematically impoverished by the 
international capitalist economic system. The main players in 
the international capitalist system are the developed core 
(the West and other industrialized states) and the 
underdeveloped periphery (the Third World). The systematic
11Frederick Engels, "The Condition of the Working Class 
in England in 1844," chapter 3 in Marx and Engels on the 
Popu1ation Bomb. ed. Ronald L. Meek (Berkeley, California: 
Ramparts Press, 1971), 70-71.
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impoverishment of the Third World is portrayed as the 
inevitable result of the international capitalist system: the 
core imports raw materials bought at low prices from the 
periphery, and the periphery buys the finished products (made 
from the raw materials) back at a higher price. This uneven 
transfer is accomplished by the multinational corporations of 
the capitalist economies With the collaboration of the 
dominant elite class in a Third World country. The "comprador" 
elite has economic interests in common with the elite of the 
core states and their colleagues in the multinational 
corporations (MNCs).12
As the problems of underdevelopment and impoverishment 
in the developing world are wholly results of an international 
economic system, so too is the "population problem" created 
that system. The population problem (which the political and 
economic institutions of the developed world— or core— now 
need to "control") is twofold: The nascent core states
exported "death control" technologies (modern medicine) to 
their overseas territories and colonies (which later became 
"the, developing world"), but refused to invest in industrial 
job-creation technology in those same territories, preferring 
instead to keep these areas as captive providers of raw 
materials. When international capitalism did finally invest in 
these territories, it brought in "overdeveloped" technology
12Tony Smith, "The Dependency Approach," in New Directions 
in Comparative Politics, ed. Howard Wiarda (Boulder\ Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1990), 124.
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"perhaps a bit too backward for serious competition with [the 
capitalist states'] production but always too advanced and 
capital-intensive to give much work to idle hands,"13 Thus, 
between "death control" and "disemployment," the developed 
world has created the so-called population problem, and needs 
to eliminate the resultant people, who are a waste 
(economically) and a potential threat (politically).
Implications of the Development Literature
Clearly, of the three main approaches to studying 
development in the Third World, the Marxist/dependency 
conceptual framework is the one that most directly addresses 
population control as a development issue, but it does so by 
dismissing the need for such policies as chimerical. It also 
readily suggests that coercion will be used to achieve 
decreased population growth rates, with the core states acting 
through their comprador agents to eliminate the "excess" 
people. However, as we shall see, Maoist China's leadership 
(hardly "comprador" agents) has generally seen population 
control— far from being a plot of the developed West— as 
necessary to attaining its own development goals. An analyst 
(and, presumably, the Chinese leadership) would be hard- 
pressed to understand the role of coercion in Chinese 
population policies as driven by international capitalism; 
thus one should question the Marxist/dependency assertion that
13 Steve Weissman, forward in Meek, xvii.
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the need for population control is essentially chimerical.14
This brief survey has indicated that the cultural and 
I institutional conceptual frameworks do not address the 
population issue directly. On the other hand, by applying 
their respective logics to the issue of population control, 
one sees that either argument may lead an observer to expect 
instances of coercive policy. By placing causality in culture, 
the former immediately raises the specter of cultural
resistance to population planning. Faced with cultural 
inertia, a regime bent upon achieving development goals may 
have to resort to coercive tactics to effect dramatic change 
in population growth rates. The institutional logic, on the 
other hand, underscores why a regime may feel that its
development goals hinge upon solving the population problem: 
fewer people mean mobilized demand-makers are less likely to 
overwhelm the regime's capacity to deliver the benefits of 
"development."
Four Population Planning Initiatives Assessed 
We have seen above that the issue of coercion and 
population control is worth examination in political science, 
given the ascendancy of democratization and market
14A more detailed discussion of the Chinese leadership's
attitude toward population planning is forthcoming below. 
Population planning has indeed been a hotly-debated 
ideological issue among the PRC's elite, but for most of the 
last twenty-odd years debate has centered upon how rigorous 
population policy should be, instead of whetherr to have a 
policy.
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liberalization over authoritarian and central planning models 
of governance. Moreover, I have surveyed the population issue 
from the perspective of the three predominant approaches to 
development, each of which suggested— or allowed— that 
coercive tactics would be employed in meeting population 
targets. The development literature, then, implies 
difficulties for regimes attempting to maximize the goals of 
population planning and democratization concurrently.
Now I turn my discussion toward the assessment of 
several case studies: the population policies of the
governments of China, India, Thailand, and Japan. Since World 
War II, each of these governments has embraced population 
planning, generally undeterred by anti-Malthusian arguments. 
Perhaps more persuasive than the anti-Malthusian arguments has 
been the evidence that population growth rates in the 
developing world outpace what the rates of today's developed 
states were at comparable income levels.15 Fearful of 
population growth rates undercutting what otherwise would have 
been economic and social development— and perhaps political 
development, if existing governing institutions were to be 
overwhelmed by demands by an ever-growing populace— the 
governments of India, China, Thailand, and Japan have 
responded with policies of population planning.
I will first present brief histories of population
15John R. Weeks, Population: An Introduction to Concepts 
and Issues (Berkeley, California: Wadsworth Publishing
Company, 1981), 348.
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policy in China, a modernizing authoritarian regime? in India, 
one of the few developing states that has maintained 
democratic government since independence (save for the 1975- 
1977 Emergency period); in Japan, whose nascent democratic 
state needed much "re-development,” in the political and 
economic upheavals engendered by World War II*s aftermath? and 
in Thailand, which, like many developing states, has had 
trouble sustaining democratic institutions in the post-war 
period. My intention in these sections is to document the 
evolution of these policies, with particular reference to 
coercive interludes: such documentation will provide a context 
to the quantitative analysis. There, I will correlate reports 
of coercive tactics with annual data from the four states, 
assessing the role coercion played in controlling population 
momentum, and the how other variables may have contributed to 
braking this momentum.
Generally User-Friendlv: India's Policy
Shortly after Independence, a centralized Planning 
Commission was appointed in India to develop a plan for 
balanced and effective use of natural resources to speed 
economic development. The Commission*s First Five Year Plan 
(1951-56) recognized that reasonable family planning measures 
would be an important determinant in speeding economic
21
development.16 However, in this early phase the government 
moved cautiously: the exercise remained largely an academic
and experimental one.17 Even so, 21 rural and 12 6 urban 
family planning clinics were opened during this period.18
The Second Five-Year Plan (1956-1961) continued and 
expanded the "clinical” approach to family planning; 
authorities expected that people would avail themselves of 
clinic services. Not as successful as expected, this approach 
gave way to a "community extension" strategy in 1963, midway 
through the Third Five Year Plan. The idea was to provide 
family planning services close to people's homes through an 
enlarged network of primary health centers while conducting an 
intense educational campaign to lift taboos on open discussion 
of family planning.19
The next several years brought great changes to 
population control measures in India. In 1965, the IUD gained 
prominence, hailed as the "one cure" to family planning.20 
Shortly thereafter, in 1966, the government established a 
full-fledged Department of Health and Family Planning to
16Mahendra K. Premi, The Demographic Situation in India. 
No. 80, Papers of the East-West Population Institute Series 
(Honolulu, Hawaii: East-West Population Institute Press,
1982), 54.
17Georgia Lee Kangas, Population Dilemma: India's Struggle 
for Survival (New Delhi, India: Mayfair Press, 1985), 98.
18Premi, 54.
19Ibid.
20Kangas, 105.
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administer the population control program, under both time- 
bound and target-oriented goals.21 This specificity of 
targets and time-frame, combined with the "one-cure” approach, 
seems to have set the stage for the excesses of the Emergency 
period.
In the years immediately prior to Indira Ghandi's 1975 
Emergency proclamation, sterilization (tubectomy and 
especially vasectomy) had become the “one-cure” approach to 
population control in India. Modeled on a successful program 
in Kerala State, sterilization centers and mobile units became 
common across India.22 The Center built cash incentives into 
the program, and many states added negative incentives such as 
preventing families with more than three children from 
receiving educational or food benefits.23 In the atmosphere 
of the Emergency, obsessiveness about meeting the centrally- 
set targets filtered down from the Center to the state and 
local authorities. Rumors recounted raids on villages by local 
officials and compulsory roundups of the poor, the 
untouchables, the uneducated, and Muslims.24 Furthermore, in 
the Emergency period, much of the government’s own civil
21Premi, 55.
22Ibid. , 56.
23Kangas, 115, 120.
24Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr., and Stanley A. Kochanek, 
India: Government and Politics in a Developing Nation
(Washington, D.C.: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Publishers,
1986), 218.
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service was alienated when promotions were made contingent 
upon proof of sterilization.25 When Indira Ghandi called 
elections in 1977, the damage had been done to both the 
population control program and the Congress Party. The Janata 
Party and its allies exploited the issue— as well as other 
arbitrary abuses of power during the Emergency— and took 33 0 
of 542 Parliamentary seats, promising to downsize and reorient 
the population program around strictly voluntary measures.26
Indira Ghandi, upon her return to government in 1980, 
raised the family planning budget in the Sixth Five Year Plan 
(1980-1985) over its Janata levels— but it still remained a 
smaller percentage of the total development budget , than it had 
been from 1969 to 1977.27 Indian population policy:has since 
emphasized voluntary family planning. The current state and 
prospects of the population control program is captured in the 
words of one recent commentator:
"If we really succeed in [population control], India 
will. . . do so by adopting [a] voluntary family planning
programme." 28
25Gayl D. Ness and Hirofumi Ando, The Land is Shrinking: 
Population Planning in Asia (Baltimore, Maryland: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1984), 88.
26Ibid., 220, and Kangas, 176.
27Kangas, 126.
28Mamata Lakshmanna, Population Control and Family 
Planning in India (Maujpur, Delhi, India: Discovery Publishing 
House, 1988), 11.
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Slave to (Ideological^ Fashion: China's Policy
In the early years after the Revolution, the Chinese 
Communist Party was most interested in rehabilitating a war- 
damaged economy and had a tendency to believe, "the more 
Chinese, the better."29 Thus no population control policy 
was promulgated in the early days of the PRC, despite China's 
high birth rate and now lower-than-ever death rates. Policies 
and propaganda indicated that the building of socialism in 
China would both require and provide for as many Chinese as 
possible.30
By 1953, the new regime had second thoughts— it found 
that population pressure had undercut improvements in living 
standards, education, housing, and medical care. That year, 
the Government Administrative Council, predecessor to the 
State Council, instructed local health authorities to help the 
public with contraceptive measures, and it simultaneously 
eased restrictions on abortion. In 1957, Mao Zedong himself 
issued a statement supportive of population control.31 
Shortly thereafter, in the disruptions engendered by the Great 
Leap Forward, a reaction to the population program began. In 
this new ascendancy of "leftist" population theory, the 
message "the more, the better" was again emphasized to the
29Hou Wenruo, "Population Policy," in China's Population: 
Problems and Prospects. the China Case Studies Series 
(Beijing, China: New World Press, 1981), 56.
30Ibid. , 58.
31Ibid. , 60.
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Chinese, and anyone advocating population control measures was 
derisively labeled "bourgeois Malthusian.1,32 After the 1958 
Great Leap Forward commenced, peasants were busy producing 
poor-quality backyard steel. They had little time to harvest 
their crops? in the ensuing "Great Leap Famine," fertility 
dropped dramatically.33 Thus the government's renewed 
emphasis on "the more, the better," from the late 1950s to the 
early 1960s becomes a bit more comprehensible.
In 1962, there was another population policy reversal. 
The State Committee again called on localities to provide 
education about family planning and, for the first time, to 
produce and supply adequate amounts of free contraceptive 
devices. Abortion and sterilization were also made still 
easier to obtain.34 Propaganda complemented this renewed 
interest in population control, and the government warned 
young people of the consequences of early marriage: men would 
dissipate their bodily fluids and women would endanger their 
own health as well as the health of their child. The press 
promoted the two-child family ideal, and tried to popularize
32Ibid. , 62.
33Please see Judith Bannister, China1s Changing 
Population. (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press,
1987), 59; and also Dudley L. Poston, Jr., "Fertility Trends 
in China," in The Population of Modern China, ed. Dudley L. 
Poston, Jr., and David Yaukey (New York: Plenum Press, 1992), 
278.
34H o u  Wenruo, 63.
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a variety of contraceptive alternatives.35
Yet this interest in population control was also short­
lived. During the Cultural Revolution (1966-1969), population 
control efforts ceased.36 Unbridled population growth, 
though, soon undercut improvements in urban housing and 
education. Population policy commanded more attention after 
1970. By 1974, Mao had re-emphasized that population numbers 
must be controlled, and the regime made family planning a 
citizen duty in the Fifth National Peoples' Congress.37 
Throughout the mid- and late 1970s, the Chinese government 
began to offer numerous incentives for family planning, such 
as resuming to supply free contraception and offering "sick 
leave" for abortions or sterilizations.38 However, this 
renewed interest in population control throughout the 1970s 
had a darker side as well: As in India, local authorities 
became trapped between targets mandated by the center (to 
reduce China's population growth rate to 1 per 100 by 1980) 
and the impossibility of achieving this target by voluntary 
measures alone. Thus there is much doubt about how "voluntary" 
the steep rise in IUD insertions (1971— 6 million, 1973— 14
35Bannister, 150.
36Hou Wenruo, 64.
37Ibid. , 66.
38Penny Kane, The Second Billion: Population and Family 
Planning in China (Ringwood, Victoria, Australia: Penguin
Books Australia, Ltd., 1987), 81.
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million, 1975— 17 million) really was throughout the 1970s.39
In 1979 the government initiated its call for the 
single-child family.40 Despite early mixed signals from 
government and Party about the seriousness of this policy, the 
significance of a particularly strong statement in June 1982 
by Premier Zhao Ziyang (re-emphasizing strict controls on 
second births, and the prevention of third births "by all 
effective means") was not lost upon provincial and local 
authorities.41 The Center effectively placed these
authorities in an even tighter bind than they had faced in the 
1970s. In this political atmosphere, authorities no longer had 
to monitor unauthorized pregnancies or waste time "counseling" 
women to have abortions? instead, they increasingly opted for 
the permanent birth control that India had promoted in the 
1970s. Sterilization increased sharply in 1983 (80% of those 
sterilized were female), much of which was reportedly 
coercive.42
A more moderate approach to population policy began in 
1984. The regime allowed more "exceptions" to the one-child 
rule, publicly disavowed coercive tactics, and decided to base 
family planning work on "local conditions." Aside from
39John S. Aird, Slaughter of the Innocents: Coercive Birth 
Control in China (Washington, D.C.: The American Enterprise 
Institute Press, 1990), 26.
40Kane, 186.
41Ibid., 93? also, Aird, 33.
42Ibid.
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upsetting the masses, coercive tactics were rather 
incompatible with the rural "responsibility policy,” which 
dismantled collectivized agriculture and gave incentives to 
peasants to produce more (children are thus seen as hands, not 
mouths) .43 Many authorities took this "relaxation" as 
effectively abolishing the one-child rule? this impression was 
further underscored by a 1988 decision to let some rural 
couples have a second child if the first was a girl.44
A New but Reliable Contender: Thailand’s Policy
Unlike China or India, Thailand did not implement any 
kind of official population control policy until 1970.45 
Indeed, by the 1950s, Thailand’s government had held a 
pronatalist population policy for half of a century. Even 
while China and India lurched toward population planning in 
hesitant steps, Thailand continued as recently as 1956 to 
offer bonuses for large families. The government reconsidered 
its position after a 1959 World Bank mission issued a report 
on the demographic situation in Thailand. The report suggested 
that a pronatalist policy could seriously hinder economic
43Ibid., 18, 33.
44Ibid., 18.
45Sidney Goldstein, "The Demography of Bangkok: The Case 
of a Primate City," in Population. Politics, and the Future in 
South Asia, ed. W. Howard Wriggins and James F. Guyot (New 
York, New York: Columbia University Press, 1973), 96.
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development plans.46
Shortly thereafter, the government appointed study 
committees and then sponsored several national population 
seminars after 1963. These early investigative efforts into 
the population issue culminated in a 1964 pilot project in a 
rural district some fifty miles from the capital of 
Bangkok.47 Throughout the rest of the 1960s, the Thai 
government took steps to make birth control information more 
accessible to women who wanted it, even though it did not 
officially endorse population planning and birth control until 
1970. Furthermore, it allowed missionary hospitals in the 
rural north to use injectable contraceptives after 1966.48 
The government focused much of its initial activity, however, 
in the hospitals and clinics of Greater Bangkok.49 There, the 
government instituted postpartum programs for permanent or 
semi-permanent contraception (IUDs, female sterilization) 
immediately after giving birth.50
In 1968 the government created a population taskforce 
within the National Economic and Social Development Board, and
46John Knodel, Apichat Chamratrithirong, Nibhon Debavalya, 
Thailand's Reproductive Revolution: Fertility Decline in a
Third World Setting (Madison, Wisconsin: The University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1987), 173.
47Ibid. , 174.
48Ibid. , 175.
49Goldstein, 99.
50Knodel, 175.
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delegated to it the task of issuing a final recommendation on 
the population question. The taskforce's research, combined 
with the efforts of the Ministry of Public Health and the 
National Research Council, resulted in the 1970 declaration by 
the Thai cabinet that the new, formal population policy would 
be to slow population growth.51
In accordance with the new policy, the government 
established the official National Family Planning Program to 
coordinate voluntary family planning efforts in Thailand. 
Throughout the next several years, the antinatalist population 
policy remained in place despite changes of government? a 
clause in the new 1974 constitution enshrined the importance 
of population matters to the welfare of the Thai people.52
Because of the preliminary moves toward dissemination of 
information about birth control in the late 1960s, public 
health personnel in most provinces already had some 
familiarity or training in family planning. Furthermore, many 
family planning services were placed directly under the 
Ministry of Public Health after 1970. Thereafter, the Ministry 
integrated its existing extensive infrastructure of child and
51Ibid. , 174.
52Mya Saw Shin discusses the 1974 constitution at length 
in The Constitutions of Thailand (Washington, D.C.: Law
Library of the Library of Congress, 1981), 52-55, microfiche. 
Articles 27-53 describe the rights of the Thai people? 
Articles 54-61, the Thai people's duties; and Articles 62-94, 
a list of "directive principles" for the regime, which 
includes an assurance that a population policy "consistent 
with Thailand's level of economic and social development" will 
be implemented.
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maternal health centers with the family planning services.53
After the promulgation of the 1970 policy, the Ministry 
of Public Health expanded the postpartum program of IUD 
insertion and sterilization beyond Bangkok to its regional 
hospitals and clinics. Injectable contraceptives gained 
widespread use in government hospitals and clinics after 1975. 
Also increasingly prevalent in the 1970s was a Thai-pioneered 
female sterilization procedure that required little in the way 
of elaborate equipment or technical training. After 1976, the 
government eliminated the nominal charges associated with this 
procedure as well as with IUD insertion and oral contraceptive 
prescriptions. In the 1980s, a long-acting subdermal 
contraceptive has been piloted within the National Family 
Planning Program, although sterilization has become the most 
emphasized procedure in the program's educational campaign.54
Since 1971, the government has supplemented this hospital- 
and clinic-approach to family planning with a community 
extension strategy that allows trained nurses and midwives to 
distribute oral contraceptives through 3,500 health stations, 
which are more accessible to the rural population than the 350 
government-sponsored health clinics. Village health volunteers 
are now permitted the pill-distribution function as well. By
53Margaret Wolfson, Changing Approaches to Population 
Problems, Development Centre Study Series (Paris, France: 
Development Center of the Organization for Economic Co- 
Operation and Development with the World Bank, 1978), 77.
4
54Knodel, 175, 177.
32
1983, the Ministry of Public Health instituted a program to 
train the nurses and midwives in administering injectable 
contraceptives, further augmenting the role of the village- 
level health-care providers.55
Reading Between the Lines: Japan's "Policy11
On the crowded islands of Japan, the population question 
emerged as a policy issue rather earlier than in the other 
Asian case studies under consideration. The Tanaka Cabinet 
appointed a Commission on Population and Food as early as 
1927. Among its recommendations was a "reasonable” diffusion 
of information and contraceptives. However, the Commission's 
other recommendations reflected the tenor of the times in 
Japan. Aside from population control through voluntary family 
planning, the Commission also urged external colonization.56
Throughout the 1930s, Japan's government remained lax in 
its enforcement of anti-abortion laws. Concurrently, though, 
the Japanese leadership fretted about the downward drift in 
fertility from industrialization and urbanization, both of 
which stemmed in large part from militarization. If the 
downward drift continued, the leadership feared, Japan might 
lose the abundance of manpower that enabled and excused
55Ibid. , 176.
56Irene B. Taeuber, The Population of Japan (Princeton, 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1958), 366.
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military expansion.57 Japan's leadership linked population 
growth to a "grand project," just as post-Revolutionary China 
later would: it was argued that building the Greater East
Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere would both require and provide for 
as many Japanese as possible.
The Allied victory in the Pacific War crushed immediate 
hopes for establishing a Japanese-lead economic order in East 
Asia, for Japan's own economy and politics were in disarray. 
The islands were occupied by a foreign power, and Japan could 
not secure markets for manufactured goods or find sources of 
raw materials.58 Despite the loss of a significant portion of 
the marriageable male cohort, by 1947 fertility remained quite 
high, a result of years of pre-war and wartime socialization 
efforts.59 Given the impossibility of territorial expansion, 
the density of population, and the need for capital 
accumulation to rebuild the economic base of the islands, the 
Japanese leadership, with the tacit approval of the occupation 
authorities, moved toward an unofficial antinatalist 
population policy in the late 1940s.60
The solution emerged in the form of a modification of the 
1940 National Eugenic Law. As revised in 1948, it effectively
57Ibid., 266.
58Robert W. Hodge and Naohiro Ogawa, Fertility Change in 
Contemporary Japan. Population and Development Series 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991), 1.
59Taeuber, 369.
60Taeuber, 369; also Hodge and Ogawa, 2.
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legalized abortion, contraception, and sterilization in Japan, 
although the 1948 law and the revisions to it were advanced 
primarily as measures to eliminate inferior descendants and 
protect some women from the health hazards of pregnancy. The 
first provision of the 1948 legislation regulated voluntary—  
and in some cases compulsory— sterilization if particular 
hereditary or infectious diseases were present in the parents. 
Later revisions to this section allowed sterilization for 
maternal health reasons. The second provision of the 1948 law 
permitted abortions subject to the discretion of the
physician, the wishes of the woman and her spouse, and, in 
some cases, the approval of the local Eugenic Protection 
Committee. This second provision required nominal
justification under broadly-defined maternal health or 
economic criteria. The Eugenic Protection Committees were 
eliminated after a 1952 revision to this section of the 
legislation.61 Finally, the third provision of the 1948 
Eugenics Law effectively legalized contraception, which had 
been illegal to discuss before and during World War II.62 The 
government gave physicians (and later, licensed nurses and
midwives) in Public Health Centers responsibility for
contraceptive assistance and the dissemination of
61 Ibid., 269.
62Carl Mosk, Patriarchy and Fertility; Japan and Sweden. 
1880-1960. Population and Social Structure Series (New York, 
New York: Academic Press, 1983), 200.
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information.63
Throughout the period of the late 1940s, various 
I commissions and committees made inquiries and recommendations
4
on the population problem in Japan, while the government still 
eschewed official population control policy. One such 
committee, the Population Planning Committee, favored 
strengthening the compulsory sections of the 1948 National 
Eugenics Law in order to improve "quality," but the government 
ignored its recommendations. Although the government’s 
official measures continued to be linked medical and eugenic 
reasons, it increasingly made its position clear on the need 
to limit the growth rate. From 1947 to 1950 the Prime 
Minister's Statistics Bureau reminded the Japanese public of 
the islands' high number of births, their low number of 
deaths, and the size of their population versus the size of 
the labor force.64
By the mid-1950s, most ordinary Japanese had knowledge 
of the new, unrestrictive abortion laws and the clinics in 
which one could secure abortion or contraceptive services.65 
People had availed themselves of the services to such degree 
that the government began to worry about halting the decline 
in fertility.66 In the decade after 1947 the government
63Taeuber, 270.
^Ibid., 372-373.
65Mosk, 201.
^Taeuber, 375.
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witnessed the dramatic 50% decrease in the crude birthrate, 
and by 1957 a replacement level of fertility was achieved. 
Ever since the late 1950s, fertility has fluctuated over a 
very narrow range; the annual rate of population growth has 
remained just above or below 1.0 per 100 people, and since 
1975-1976, has tended toward below 1.0 per 100 people.67 
Thus the Japanese government has not needed elaborate 
strategies for population control as have the governments of 
China, India, and Thailand.
Lower Population Growth Rates:
Is Coercion the Kev?
Here I will attempt to assess the performance of these
four population control efforts. Aside from the independent
variable of political coercion in these policies, I will
*
consider the role that several other variables might play in 
decreasing rates of population growth. For India, China, and 
Thailand, I have gathered population data from 1963 to 1991, 
a period of twenty-eight years. For Japan, the relevant data 
are from an earlier period, pre-World War II up until 1960, a 
period of forty years. From the data sets of each state, I 
have also calculated an annual growth rate of the population. 
I will now consider whether political coercion or some other 
variable best explains the results within and across cases. If
67Hodge and Ogawa, 1? and Yuki Miura, ed., Japan 
Statistical Yearbook 1987. Volume 37 (Tokyo, Japan: The
Statistics Bureau of the Japanese Management Coordination 
Agency, 1987), 24-25.
reported political coercion correlates with lower rates of 
population increase, then we must consider the consequences 
for keeping population numbers in check in a democratizing 
world.
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Table I
Annual Rate of Population Growth 
in China. India, and Thailand
China India Thailand
Year
Pop.
in
Mill.
Annual
Growth
Rate
per
100
people
Pop.
in
Mill.
Annual
Growth
Rate
per
100
people
Pop.
in
Mill.
Annual
Growth
Rate
per
100
people
1963 691.7 462.0 28.5
1964 705.0 1.922 472.1 2.186 30.1 5.543
1965 725.4 2.894 482.7 2.240 31.0 3.158
1966 745.4 2.757 493.4 2.213 32.0 3.126
1967 763.7 2.455 504.3 2.219 33.0 3.125
1968 785.3 2.828 515.6 2.233 34.0 3.152
1969 806.7 2.725 527.2 2.246 35.1 3.143
1970 829.9 2.876 539.1 2.257 36.4 3.589
I 1971 852.3 2.699 551.2 2.254 37.5 3.079
1972 871.8 2.288 563.5 2.231 38.6 2.934
1973 892.1 2.329 575.9 2.193 39.7 2.850
1974 908.6 1.850 588.3 2.155 40.8 2.746
1975 924.2 1.717 600.7 2.118 41.9 2.678
1976 937.2 1.407 613.3 2.082 43.0 2.603
1977 949.0 1.259 625.8 2.046 44.0 2.514
1978 962.2 1.370 646.0 3.225 45.1 2.407
1979 975.4 1.330 660.0 2.167 46.1 2.306
1980 996.1 2.122 675.0 2.273 46.7 1.257
1981 1008.4 1.235 690.0 2.222 47.7 2.183
1982 1020.6 1.210 705.0 2.174 48.7 2.032
1983 1032.9 1.205 720.0 2.128 49.7 1.991
1984 1045.8 1.229 736.0 2.270 50.6 1.932
1985 1059.5 1.310 750.9 2.019 51.6 1.856
1986 1074.1 1.378 766.1 2.035 52.5 1.803
1987 1089.6 1.452 781.4 1.988 53.4 1.752
1988 1105.8 1.487 796.6 1.949 54.3 1.684
1989 1122.4 1.501 811.8 1.911 55.2 1.620
1990 1139.1 1.488 827.1 1.876 56.1 1.576
1991 1155.8 1.466 849.6 2.731 56.9 1.498
Source: The International Monetary Fund Statistics Department, 
The International Financial Statistics Yearbook (Washington, 
D.C.: The International Monetary Fund, 1992), 28O728I, 408- 
409, 578-579; annual growth rate calculated by author.
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Table II
Annual Rate of Population Growth in Japan
Japan
Yaar Pop. in Mill. Annual 
Qrowth 
Rata par 100 
paopla
1920 56.0
1921 56.7 1.250
1922 57.4 1.235
1923 58.1 1.220
1924 58.9 1.377
192S 59.7 1.358
1926 60.7 1.675
1927 61.7 1.647
1928 62.6 1.459
1929 63.8 1.438
1930 64.5 1.575
1931 68.8 1.850
1932 66.4 1.374
1933 67.4 1.806
1934 68.3 1.338
1938 69.3 1.464
1936 70.1 1.118
1937 70.6 .713
1938 71.0 .567.
1939 . 71.4 .563
1940 71.9 .700
1941 72.2 .417
1942 72.9 .970
1943 73.9 1.371
1944 74.4 .677
1946 72.1 -3.09
1946 78.8 8.132
1947 78.1 3.034
1948 80.0 2.433
1949 81.8 2.250
19S0 83.2 1.711
1981 84.8 1.563
1952 88.8 1.538
1953 87.0 1.399
1954 88.2 1.379
1955 89.3 1.247
1956 90.2 1.008
1957 90.9 .776
1958 91.8 .990
1959 92.6 .871
1960 93.4 .864
Source: Yuki Miura, ed., Japan Statistical Abstract 1987, 
Volume 37 (Tokyo, Japan: The Statistical Bureau of the 
Japanese Management Coordination Agency, 1987), 23-25; annual 
growth rate calculated by author.
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Coercion correlates well with the population growth rates 
observed for China and India in Table One. Specifically, 
China's rate of population growth decreased dramatically 
during the first interval of coercive tactics (approximately 
1971-1979), and the second interval (approximately 1981-1984). 
India's growth rate also noticeably dropped during the 
Emergency period (1975-1977), when Indira Ghandi's regime 
resorted to coercive tactics. On the other hand, it is also 
obvious that other independent variables are operating as 
well; they will be considered in turn.
The Coercion Connection
More generally, both China and India have generally 
experienced decreasing rates of population growth during the 
periods in which they have had population control policies. 
Furthermore, when analyzed in light of the role of coercion in 
the programs' respective histories, the rates generally rose 
fell when one would expect, relative to the degree of 
coercion.
In China, for example, after the beginning of the 
Cultural Revolution, there was a rise in population growth 
rates until 1970, reflecting the abandonment of family 
planning efforts. Then, throughout the 1970s, one witnesses 
the steady drop from the increase of 2.69 per 100 people per 
year (1970-71) to 1.33 per 100 people per year (1978-79) as 
local authorities relentlessly and coercively pursued a 1980
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target growth rate of 1.0 per 100 people per year. After the 
one-child policy began to be pursued in earnest in the early 
1980s, growth rates continued this steep decline, dipping to 
around 1.20 and 1.22 per 100 people per year in the years of 
highest coercion, in the early- to mid-1980s. Interestingly, 
the exceptional interval in the history of China*s policy 
falls in 1980, after the announcement of the one-child policy. 
Nevertheless, in the first few years of the new decade, the 
political elite remained indecisive and divided about the 
future of the one-child policy in particular and about family 
planning in general. Nevertheless, a hardline position soon 
prevailed after 1981-1982, and growth rates continued their 
steep decline. Predictably, the growth rates have risen 
somewhat with the relaxations of the one-child policies in 
1984 and in 1988.'
In India, one sees that the strictly voluntary programs 
pursued throughout the 1960s had seemingly little effect, with 
the rate of growth remaining around 2.2 per 100 people per 
year. As sterilization centers and mobile units became more 
common in the early 1970s, the rates dipped? then they reached 
a new low (expectedly) during the excesses of the 1975-77 
Emergency period.
After the Emergency, 1978 brought a notable increase in 
the Indian growth rate, probably a reaction to the coercive 
policies of the Emergency period. Despite a lack of coercive 
tactics, growth rates began a new slide almost immediately.
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This suggests other independent variables are at work in the 
Indian case.
The data for Thailand do not suggest a correlation 
between levels of political coercion and the population growth 
rates, as no coercive measures have been reported. Indeed, the 
data suggest that Thailand is a case where strictly voluntary 
measures have had remarkable effect in moderating population 
growth rate over a twenty-year interval. Japan also succeeded 
in achieving a decreased population growth rate without any 
reports of widespread government-sponsored coercive tactics, 
but the uniqueness of Japan's historical circumstances must be 
taken into account: it only had to reverse a growth rate that 
had been manipulated upward by pre-War socialization. Thus, 
both the Thai and Japanese cases also suggest that one should 
consider several other independent variables, in addition to 
political coercion. Some suggested variables are considered in 
turn below.
Structural Characteristics of the Programs
Another possible explanation for variation in data 
across cases is how the programs were structured and managed, 
setting aside the variable of coercive tactics. In all of the 
cases, governments implemented the population policy by 
devolving much authority to local authorities: none of these 
programs were micro-managed from the Center. In China and 
India, the Center only set the targets, and granted great
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leeway to local authorities. On the other hand, in Thailand 
and Japan, little or no emphasis was placed upon setting and 
meeting specific regional and local targets. Yet the Thai and 
Japanese programs also placed great authority in the hands of 
local actors (individual physicians in Japan, most local 
health personnel in Thailand). Thus, all governments in this 
survey structured their population initiatives in a 
decentralized fashion over the periods in the data sets? it 
seems unlikely that structural characteristics of the program 
(extent of centralization versus decentralization, for 
example) provide one with additional explanatory variables.
Urbanization/Industrialization
The inseparable phenomena of urbanization and 
industrialization provide another intuitively satisfying 
explanation for the data. Indeed, available statistics on 
urbanization and industrialization in these four states 
suggest that these variables have contributed to the observed 
population growth rates.
Traditional agricultural families have always tended to 
want more children than urban families, to assure enough hands 
to work the land and provide a measure of "social security" to 
parents in old age.68 Three of the states in this study had
^The World Bank Staff, Population Change and Economic 
Development. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), 71? 
see also Song Jian, "Population Development: Goals and Plans," 
in China’s Population: Problems and Prospects. The China Case 
Study Series (Beijing, China: New World Press, 1981), 22? and
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relatively.low levels of urbanization in 1970, but have seen 
significant urbanization since then. In 1970, 13% of the Thai 
people lived in cities, as did 20% and 17% of the Indian and 
Chinese populations, respectively. By 1990, an additional 10% 
of Thais dwelt in cities, making the total portion of urban 
inhabitants 23%. By 1990, China had swept past India in urban 
population: 56% of its inhabitants were urban, as compared to 
only 27% of India*s.
Table III
Urban Population of China. India, and Thailand
Year China 
% urban
India 
% urban
Thailand 
% urban
1970 17 20 13
1990. 56 27 23
Source: The World Bank Staff, World Tables 1993 (Baltimore, 
Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), 184-187, 320- 
323, 594-595.
Given the natural tendency of urban populations to have 
smaller families, and that state propaganda possibly reaches 
an urban population more effectively than a rural one, the 
variable of urbanization might help explain the data observed 
for India, China, and Thailand: as urbanization increased, 
rates of population growth rates tended to decrease. It seems 
plausible that a process of urbanization and industrialization 
over the last two decades provided an independent brake on
Sripati Chandrasekhar, Infant Mortality. Population Growth, 
and Family Planning in India (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 1972), 252.
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population growth, concurrent to the waxing and waning of 
coercive tactics in China and India. It also helps explain the 
continued decreases in growth rates observed in (post- 
Emergency) India and Thailand, where there have been no 
reports of coercive tactics.
Indeed, this additional variable is also most helpful in 
explaining the earlier data from Japan. Increased urbanization 
and industrialization, themselves a result of increased 
militarization in the decades before World War II, prompted 
the Japanese leadership’s call for increased procreation among 
Japanese in the 1930s. Indeed, by the mid-1930s Japan's 
population was already 33% urban, and approached 40% 
immediately after Japan's defeat and occupation.
Table IV 
Urban Population of Japan
Year % Urban
1935 32.9
1945 41.1
1955 56.3
1965 68.0
1975 75.7
1985 76.7
Sources: United Nations Statistical Office, Department of
Economic and Social Affairs, 1960 Demographic Yearbook (New 
York, New York: The United Nations, 1960), 383. Figures
exclude allied Occupation Forces. From same office, see 1970 
Demographic Yearbook (New York, New York: The United Nations, 
1970), 145. For post-1970 data, see World Bank Staff, World 
Tables 1993 (Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1992), 350-351.
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That the population was already so urban in comparison to 
the other cases suggests why the Japanese government could 
drastically reduce growth rates in such a short period without 
resorting to coercive tactics: a population so urban would
need less convincing, particularly in the face of economic 
disruptions, that smaller families were again a better idea. 
Moreover, this conclusion is supported by Japan*s success at 
keeping annual population growth rates around 1.0 per 100 
people since the 1950s: by 1965, the population of the
Japanese islands was 68% urban, and the figure has stabilized 
around roughly 75% since the 1970s.
Across the four cases, the process of urbanization (and 
related industrialization) seems to be a variable with good 
explanatory power when considered in light of these data. One 
final note to those who would might suggest that urbanization 
is the only variable one needs to explain these data: most of 
China*s significant increases in urbanization took place in 
the 1980-1990 interval of the 1970-1990 period, well after the 
first reports— and effects— of coercive population control 
tactics. It seems, then, that rate of urbanization alone could 
not fully explain the observed data.69
69Please see World Bank Staff, World Tables 1993 
(Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), 
186-187.
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Methods of Family Planning Promoted
Did the program of one country promote particular 
measures of birth control whose success could effectively 
explain the data? As indicated in the brief outline I gave of 
the histories of population control in these Asian states, all 
countries generally have encouraged permanent— or at least 
long-acting— contraception of minimal complexity. Such methods 
have included IUDs (India, late 1960s? China, 1970s; Thailand 
1970s-present), sterilization (India, 1970s; China, early 
1980s? Thailand, 197Os-present), and injectable, subdermal, 
and oral contraception (Thailand, mid-197Os-present). 
Moreover, abortion, a particularly effective (if to somie, 
including many of the Japanese population commissions, morally 
unsettling) form of birth control has been central to at least 
two of the programs (Japan, 1950s; China, early 1980s).70 Of 
these long-acting or permanent methods, only oral 
contraception requires more than a periodic procedure, but 
Thailand has clearly supplemented the role of oral 
contraception with other methods. Thus it seems unlikely that 
the effectiveness of particular contraceptive devices or 
procedures could explain the data observed in this four-state 
assessment.
70The Japanese population scholars' distaste for abortion 
is well documented in Taeuber, 375.
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Empowerment of Female Population
Another potential explanatory variable is the social, 
political, and economic status of women in these four Asian 
states. Studies often suggest a connection between a cluster 
of interrelated empowerment issues (education, literacy, and 
status) and better use of family planning facilities and 
practices.71 As basic indicators of the relative status of 
women in these societies, I will use the percentage of female 
population enrolled in secondary school and rates of female 
illiteracy.
From 1970 to 1990, female enrollment in secondary school 
grew in Thailand, India, and China. In India, enrollment in 
secondary education of the relevant age group increased from 
15% to 33%. An almost identical upswing is evident in 
Thailand, which in the same period increased enrollment from 
15% to 32%. Data on China is not available for 1970, but by 
1990, 41% of females in the relevant age group were enrolled 
in secondary education.72 Despite the lack of earlier data on 
China, it seems that there is an inverse relationship between 
secondary schooling and the rate of population growth over the 
1970-1990 period.
71Marcela Ballara, Women and Literacy. Women and World 
Development Series (New Jersey: Zed Books Limited, 1992), 13.
72The World Bank Staff, The World Development Report 1993 
(Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 
294-295.
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To assess the status of women across the four cases, the 
most recent estimates of female illiteracy are helpful 
additional indicators. Female illiteracy above age 15 were 66% 
in India, 38% in China, and a surprisingly low 10% in 
Thailand.73 Given the similar increase of Thailand and India 
in secondary enrollment, the difference in the female 
illiteracy rates is somewhat surprising, yet the remarkable 
Thai illiteracy rate might be attributable to an unusually 
successful system of primary education.74
Taken together, these educational indicators suggest that 
women are relatively more empowered in Thailand (increased 
enrollment, very low illiteracy) and China (higher enrollment 
than the other states, literacy in between the other states) 
than in India (increased enrollment, but very high 
illiteracy). By the logic of the empowerment variable, 
population growth rate should be more resistant to reduction 
in India than in China and Thailand. Indeed, this has been the 
case.
This variable also holds explanatory power for the 
earlier data on Japan as well. In the aftermath of World War 
II, American educational advisors recommended a radical
^The World Bank Staff, Social Indicators of Development 
(Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press) , 71, 
153, 227.
740n the subject of the state of Thai primary'education, 
please see uWho*s Nicst?” The Economist. 13 August 1994, 31.
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restructuring of traditional Japanese education.75 One 
component of this reform was a conscious decision to reduce 
! gender inequities in schools; this policy decision held even 
after the departure of the Occupation forces. As such, the 
percentage of girls entering upper secondary levels has risen 
from 37% in 1950 to 56% in 1960 and to 83% in 1970, 
correlating with a decrease in population growth rates. This 
enrollment rate has remained around 95% since 1979, and by 
1984, Japan achieved a female literacy rate of 97%.76 If the 
logic of the empowerment argument is correct, the remarkable 
the strides in female enrollment in the 1950s and 1960s should 
correlate with decreases in the rate of population growth, 
which they do. Additionally, these enrollment figures, in 
conjunction with the high rate of female literacy attained by 
the 1980s, would suggest that Japan should have a noticeably 
lower rate of population increase than any of the other cases; 
indeed, this proves true. The case of Japan, then, supports 
the possibility that female empowerment is an additional 
explanatory variable in controlling population growth.
75Edward R. Beauchamp, "The Development of Japanese 
Educational Policy," in Windows on Japanese Education ed. 
Edward R. Beauchamp (New York, New York: Greenwood Press, 
1991), 29-30.
76Please see Kumiko Fuj imara-Fanselow and Anne E. Imamura, 
"The Education of Women in Japan," in Windows on Japanese 
Education ed. Edward R. Beauchamp (New York, New York: 
Greenwood Press, 1991), 234; and George Thomas Kurian, The New 
Book of World Rankings (New York, New York: Facts on File, 
Inc., 1984), 358.
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Another Test of the Variables: Fertility Rates
I have used population growth rates in my analysis of
the population policies to this point, for population
statistics are probably the most readily accessible and
understandable figures. On the other hand, total fertility 
rates in some ways are a better measure by which to judge the 
success of these four programs, or ascertain the role coercion 
has played in achieving program targets. Here I will consider 
this other measure; does it bring one to the same conclusions 
about the role of coercion and the other four independent 
variables considered above? If it does, then my conclusions 
about the roles and relationships of these independent 
variables will be supported by two different statistical
measures.
The utility of using total fertility rates as a measure 
stems from their specificity; they measure the average number 
of children born alive to a- woman during her lifetime if she 
were to bear children in accordance with prevailing age- 
specific birth rates. Thus, the total fertility rate factors 
out emigration and changing death rates, two obvious phenomena 
that could skew the accuracy of using population growth rates 
to measure population policy*s effectiveness. Using this more 
sophisticated indicator, can one arrive at the same 
conclusions about the independent variables discussed above?
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Table V
Total Fertility Rates in China. India, and Thailand
Year China's 
Fertil. Rate
India's 
Fertil.Rate
Thailand's 
Fertil. Rate
1971 5.1 5.7 5.2
1972 4.9 5.6 5.0
1973 4.4 5.5 4.9
1974 3.8 5.4 4.7
1975 3.4 5.0 4.6
1976 2.9 5.3 4.4
1977 2.7 5.2 4.3
1978 2.6 5.4 4.1
1979 n•CM 5.0 4.0
1980 2.5 5.0 3.8
1981 2.3 4.9 3.7
1982 2.2 4.8 3.5
1983 2.3 4.7 3.3
1984 2.2 4.6 3.1
1985 2.4 4.4 2.9
1986 2.5 4.3 2.8
1987 2.6 4.2 2.6
1988 2.5 4.1 2.5
1989 2.5 4.1 2.4
1990 2.5 4.0 2.4
1991 2.4 3.9 2.3
Source: World Bank Staff, World Tables 1993 (Baltimore,
Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), 186-187, 321- 
322, 594-595.
In light of this demographic indicator, the effects of 
the three variables cited above still appear to hold. In China 
and India, reports of coercive policy correlate with decreased 
fertility rates in the same periods that decreases were 
evident in the population growth rates. In China's case, the
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dramatic and coercive increase of IUD insertions in the 1970s 
succeeded in quickly lowering the total fertility rate from 
5.1 to 2.3— a steeper decline than India or Thailand 
experienced in that era. India's fertility rates, however, do 
appear to have dropped during its program's brief coercive 
interlude (1975-1977). That interval is sandwiched by higher 
Indian fertility rates in 1974 and 1978. After a brief respite 
in the early 1980s when the Chinese government and Party 
articulated a less consistent message on population control, 
China's fertility rates continued to decline as local 
authorities clamped down on second births. Then, with the 
relaxation of the one-child policy after the mid-1980s, 
fertility rates have crept back upward, seeming to level out 
around 2.4 or 2.5. All of these correlations were also 
suggested by the population growth rate analysis performed 
above.
The forces of urbanization and industrialization seem to 
be confirmed by these data as well. For instance, while 
India's fertility rates seem to correspond reports of coercive 
tactics (1975-1977), they also continued to drop during the 
1980s, suggesting the presence of other forces such as 
urbanization/industrialization. Furthermore, the relatively 
more dramatic decreases in Chinese total fertility rates could 
be the result of a more rapid urbanization, as discussed 
above. Finally, as Thailand's urbanization has increased, its 
total fertility rate has fallen; this also seems <to confirm
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the inverse relationship between the two variables that I 
posited above.
From comparative data on the socioeconomic status of 
women— a third plausible independent variable— I suggested 
that women would be relatively more empowered in Thailand 
(increased enrollment, very low illiteracy) and China (higher 
enrollment than the other states, literacy in between the 
other states) than in India (increased enrollment, but very 
high illiteracy). Thus, the effects observed with the other 
measure (population growth rates) do seem to be validated by 
this measure as well, at least in the Chinese, Indian, and 
Thai cases.
Japanese fertility rates appear to confirm the 
centrality ' of two of these variables— urbanization/ 
industrialization and female empowerment. At the same time, 
the regime's pre-War pronatalism explains the lack of coercive 
tactics, for fertility rates— just as the population growth 
rates discussed above— were artificially inflated by regime 
propaganda before and during the War. As Taeuber has noted, 
Japan reaped the most dramatic results of pronatalist 
socialization after World War II, with the demobilization of 
young men who had been bombarded with pronatalist messages for 
most of their lives.77
^Taeuber, 369.
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Table VI 
Total Fertility Rate in Japan
Years Japan's Fertilitv Rate
1945-50 2.13
1950-55 2.70
1955-60 2.07
1960-65 2.02
1965-70 2.00
1970-75 2.06
1975-80 1.81
1980-85 1.76
1985-90 1.70
Source: Nathan Keyfitz and Wilhelm Fleiger, World Population: 
Demographic Trends in the Late Twentieth Century (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1990), 222.
A pattern emerges here that is similar to the one 
observed in the data on Japanese population growth rates. The 
highest recorded total fertility in Japan occurred shortly 
after World War II, in 1950-55. As the post-War regime moved 
toward an antinatalist policy with the National Eugenics Law 
and its revisions, Japan was able to realize very quick 
decreases in its fertility rates over the next several 
decades, without ever implementing a truly coercive population 
policy. Total fertility rates seem to confirm the role of 
urbanization/industrialization and female empowerment in 
curtailing population momentum. Japanese women, for example, 
have made greater strides than have those in China, Thailand, 
and (most certainly) India in the post-War era. The 
empowerment variable, in conjunction with the existing high 
levels of pre-War urbanization in Japan, no doubt meant that
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dramatic reductions in fertility could be realized with non- 
coercive population policy.
Thus, a more sophisticated indicator of population 
policy, total fertility rate, effectiveness supports the 
conclusions drawn above from using a less elaborate indicator, 
annual rate of population growth. Thus we may be fairly 
confident that coercive policy, urbanization/industriali­
zation, and female empowerment are critical independent 
variables, driving both population and fertility indicators.
Conclusions: Three Important 
Independent Variables
Of the variables considered above, the most plausible for 
explaining the results within and across cases are (1) the 
presence of political coercion, (2) degree of urbanization/ 
industrialization, and (3) level of female empowerment. Yet 
the nature of the interrelationships among these variables 
should also be assessed. To this end I will consider these 
three variables in light of the broadest trends observed in 
the data.
Program Effectiveness: Highest Highs to Lowest Lows
I note from Table I that over the years, the results of 
India's population control policies have been much less 
dramatic than the results of government policy in China, 
Thailand, or Japan. By 1991 The Chinese government decreased 
the rate of population growth in China from a high of 2.89 to
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1.48 per 100 people per year (difference = 1.41). Since the 
government's increased receptivity to antinatalist thinking in 
the 1960s, Thailand has realized a notable decrease in rate of 
population growth from 5.543 to 1.498 per 100 people 
(difference=4.05). Meanwhile, India's rate of population 
growth fell only from 2.24 to 1.88 per 100 people per year 
(difference = .36) . Japan's long-term decrease was from a 1945 
high of 5.132 per 100 people per year to .864 by 1960 
(difference= 4.268).
In Table V, fertility decreases break down similarly to 
population growth rate reductions, although the total 
fertility indicator makes Japan's strides in the post-War 
period appear to be less dramatic. Between 1971 and 1991, 
Thailand's total fertility- rates dropped from 5.2 to 2.3 
(difference = 2.9); China's, from 5.1 to 2.4 (difference =
2.7); India's, from 5.7 to 3.9 (difference = 1.8). In Table 
VI, Japan's total fertility decreased from a high of 2.7 in 
the 1950-55 interval to 1.70 in the 1985-90 interval 
(difference = 1.0).78 Indeed, fertility rates may be
"factoring out" the Japanese who returned to Japan after the 
collapse of the "Co-Prosperity Sphere." This phenomenon would 
not be evident in the population growth rates discussed above.
78For population growth rates in Japan, I used the 194 6-60 
interval to measure broadest trends, because population growth 
rates level remained consistently around .8 after 1960. 
Fertility rates have taken longer to "level off;" as Table VI 
indicates, they have decreased in every five-year interval 
since 1950. For this reason I have used the interval 1950-1990 
to measure broadest trends in fertility rates for Japan.
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Fertility indicators (as opposed to population growth rates) 
demonstrate that the magnitude of Japan*s amelioration of the 
population crisis was not as great as in the other cases. On 
the other hand, by attaining fertility of 2.07 during the 
1955-1960 interval, Japan reached a manageable level of 
fertility that the other states have yet to achieve. It also 
started out much further ahead of the other states: Japan's 
antinatalist policies began when fertility was at 2.70 rather 
than above 5.0, as in the other cases. These facts imply that 
Japan's population problem may have never been as pressing as 
the ones that continue in China, India, and Thailand. Thus, 
its resolution of the population problem would not have to be 
of the magnitude necessary in the other cases.
Program Effectiveness: Rapidity of Decreases
Another important measure of any population policy's 
effectiveness— in addition to the extent of its reduction of 
population growth rates or fertility rates— is the speed with 
which sizeable decreases are observed. Table One demonstrates 
that China's program decreased the rate of population growth 
from 2.699 to 1.330 per 100 people (difference = 1.37) in a 
very short nine years (1970-1979). On the other hand, when 
Thailand announced its official policy in 1970, the population 
was growing at a rate of 3.079 per 100 people per year. It 
took eighteen years to realize a decrease, similar to the one 
seen in China within the 1970s. Finally, the return to pre-
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1930s levels of population increase in Japan was accomplished 
within about seven years (roughly, 1945-1954).79
Coercion also succeeded in pushing fertility rates 
downward within a short period: between 1971 and 1979,
fertility rates in China slid from 5.1 to 2.3 (difference =
2.8). In the same interval, the non-coercive Thai policy only 
decreased fertility rates from 5.2 to 4.0 (difference = 1.2). 
In Thailand, it took eighteen years to achieve a similar 
decrease to the one observed in 1970s China. Meanwhile, India 
has yet to achieve a similar swift decrease of 2.8 in 
fertility rates. Like India, Japan*s reduction in fertility 
measures, meanwhile, does not appear particularly rapid 
either. Yet if the magnitude of the population problem in 
Japan was' not as great as in the other cases, as I suggested 
in the above section, then there would not be a need for rapid 
reductions in fertility rates.
Imolications
From my consideration of these broad patterns in the 
data, I believe that some generalizations are possible about
^Using the pre-1930s figures as a baseline is helpful 
because before the 1930s, the Japanese population would not 
have been socialized in the ethic of high fertility, which 
deliberately pushed the growth rate upward. I also note that 
although the data for the 1930s through the early 1940s do not 
indicate the success of staunch pronatalism, there was also 
massive out-migration from Japan beginning after the 1931 
invasion of Manchuria. The leadership's "success" in 
socializing high fertility is more evident after the return of 
troops and civilians to the Japanese islands following Allied 
victory in World War II. Please see Yuki Miura, 24'.
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the roles of these independent variables in determining the 
effectiveness of population control policies.
While political coercion, urbanization/industrialization, 
and female empowerment all correlate with decreased rates of 
population growth and reductions in fertility rates, the 
variable that correlates best with rapid decreases in the 
population growth rate is political coercion.80 The data from 
China suggest this relationship: the use of coercive tactics 
beginning in the 1970s achieved remarkable results within one 
decade. The 1974-1977 interval is particularly striking? a 
second "wave" of coercive policy in the early 198 0s pushed 
population growth rates and fertility rates even lower before 
a policy relaxation in the mid-1980s. Though the effects of 
political coercion are most evident in the data for China, in 
India, too, coercion pushed resistant growth rates and 
fertility rates to levels that would not recur until the 
early- or mid-1980s.
The Thai example supports the notion that coercion has 
been a sufficient condition for remarkable short-term 
decreases in growth rates. The Thai policy has reaped notable 
results without coercion, but these results have been attained 
in the longer term. Furthermore, although Japan returned to 
its pre-19 3 0s rate of population growth within seven years and 
did so with little or no coercion— seeming to disprove the
80Here I understand "rapid" to mean an interval shorter 
than a decade.
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relationship I suggest— in this case a generally non- 
compulsory policy was only reversing an older pronatalist 
policy that had artificially driven up growth rates. 
Furthermore, as I noted above, while fertility rates did not 
decrease as dramatically as population growth rates did, the 
time-series data on fertility do suggest that perhaps Japan's 
population problem was not as pressing as in the other states. 
Thus, unique socialization experience and a less pressing 
population crisis make it difficult to use the case of Japan 
to disprove the relationship I posit between coercion and 
short-term decreases in population growth rates and fertility 
rates.
The other two independent variables that correlate well 
with decreases in the rate of population growth were 
urbanization/industrialization and female empowerment. Both of 
these variables have probably complemented the effects of 
China's program (coercive) and Thailand's program (non- 
coercive), with the effects of urbanization/industrialization 
most pronounced in the former, and the effects of female 
empowerment most pronounced in the latter. The two variables 
aid in explaining the relatively less remarkable effects of 
India's population program (non-coercive with one 
interruption), for India falls close to Thailand on the 
urbanization variable, but appallingly far behind both China 
and Thailand on correcting female illiteracy rates. In Japan, 
female empowerment and urbanization/industrialization
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doubtless help explain the rapid decline in growth rates 
observed in post-War Japan, and the (although less notable) 
decreases in fertility rates. Japan after World War II was 
already a largely urban and industrial society; with the 
revamping and improvement of female education after World War 
II, the two variables complemented the effects of the 
generally non-compulsory Japanese Eugenics Law of 1948 which 
liberalized abortion and contraceptive alternatives. Given (1) 
Japan*s pre- and post-War strides toward urbanization and 
industrialization, (2) its post-War efforts to improve female 
education, (3) that its population policy had been strongly 
pronatalist before the war, and (4) the apparently less 
pressing nature of its population problem, one should not be 
surprised that coercive measures were never used to attain 
rapid decreases in the short-term.
Prospects for Population Planning 
in a Democratizing World
What lessons are we to draw from this survey of four 
Asian states? Upon examining the data, I suggested that the 
independent variables that held the most promising explanatory 
power for reducing rates of population growth are urbani­
zation/industrialization, policies that empower women, and the 
degree of coercion evident in population planning policies. 
More specifically, while all of the suggested independent 
variables are linked to declining rates of population growth, 
the presence of coercion in population control policies
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appeared to be a sufficient condition for rapid decreases in 
population growth rates. The Chinese data demonstrate this 
well. Of the case studies, political coercion was present for 
a sustained period only in China, and it is the only case—  
aside from the unique case of Japan— in which dramatic short­
term decreases in population growth rates were observed. 
Furthermore, Japanese reduction in fertility, a more 
sophisticated indicator of policy effectiveness, was not as 
dramatic.
It is the Thai case that gives hope for population 
control on a planet that is increasingly populous and 
increasingly democratic. Thailand's history is like much of 
the developing world: one of attempts to implement democratic 
processes that alternate with military coups.81 Despite 
Thailand's being less a "model" Third World democracy than 
India (which lapsed only 1975-1977), all Thai governments 
(whether military or elected) have consistently advocated and 
implemented voluntary family planning measures since the 
inception of that state's population control policy. The Thai 
elite has acted more wisely than India's Emergency leadership, 
which politicized the family planning issue by using coercive 
tactics. The Thai experience, then, is perhaps the most 
instructive for today's increasingly democratized Third World; 
Thailand fought "natural" population growth rates and
81John L. S. Girling, Thailand: Society and Politics
(Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1981), 104-188.
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fertility rates with voluntary measures.82
Moreover, while a moral argument may be— and
increasingly, will be— advanced against coercive practices in 
population planning, Thai case points to a practical argument 
against coercion as well. While Thailand began in 1971 with 
fertility rates very similar to China, it also had similar 
fertility rates in 1991, after twenty years (indeed, Thailand 
was slightly ahead: see Table V) . Furthermore, across the
twenty-seven years of population growth rate data, Thailand's 
population growth rate was also quite similar to China's (see 
Table I). While coercion in a closed society might be cheaper 
than a well-funded and comprehensive population planning 
initiative, and achieve dramatic results in the short term, it 
did not really put China any further ahead of Thailand by 
1991. As the history of the Chinese policy indicated, periods 
of restrictive and coercive population policy seemed 
invariably to be followed by liberalization and relaxation. 
While systematic application of coercion may achieve rapid 
decreases in either population growth rates or fertility 
rates— as suggested by this analysis— the history of Chinese 
policy suggests that coercion itself might only work in the 
short term. Even in a closed society, the Chinese case seems 
to suggest, there are limits to how long coercion can last 
before a reaction sets in (taking the form of dissension among
82This may be understood in contrast to Japan, where the 
government only reversed an earlier regime's manipulation of 
the growth rate.
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the elite or unrest in the countryside, which result in 
relaxation of coercive tactics). In short, while coercion 
achieves rapid results in the short term, it may only work in 
the short term.
By committing to a non-coercive strategy for controlling 
population growth in an urbanizing and industrializing 
society, and by implementing educational policies that empower 
its female population, the Thai government has made remarkable 
progress within an eighteen-year interval. One may be 
observing a similar pattern in 1980s India, but we might 
anticipate that decreases in India's growth rate will remain 
sluggish as long as the relative status of women remains so 
low.83 Coercion might be a sufficient condition for dramatic 
short-term decreases in the rate of population growth, as the 
Chinese case indicates; for a democratizing world to effect 
population control, however, it will have to rely on well- 
funded and comprehensive voluntary family planning 
initiatives, policies that educate women, and the forces of 
urbanization. The moral norms of democratization demand this 
strategy; the apparent limitations of coercion as long-term 
strategy also recommend it.
83The only exception to the recent decrease in Indian 
growth rates is the interval of 1990-1991, where there is a 
large and seemingly out-of-place increase in the annual rate 
of population growth. Data for the 1992-1994 interval should 
clarify whether this is outlying data or a new pattern 
emerging. On the other hand, the 1991 total fertility rate for 
India was not outlying data, so this apparent aberration might 
only be a limitation of using population growth rates as a 
measure.
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What must be remembered, however, is that voluntary 
measures (in conjunction with the other two variables of 
urbanization/industrialization and female empowerment) appear 
to have their effects in the longer term. Probably most would 
express a certain satisfaction that coercive tactics may have 
practical limitations and will further lose their utility 
(through a normative argument) in a more democratic world . On 
the other hand, neither should we forget the urgency of the 
population question underscored at the outset of this 
discussion: there is evidence that many of the neo-Malthusian 
population crises are already here and will not be resolved 
easily. Furthermore, we can already envision where these 
crises might end— politically, ecologically, and economically. 
Given the urgency of resolving population-related crises, and 
the length of time needed to implement the Thai model, the 
real lesson that emerges from this analysis is the importance 
of acting immediately to replicate the model elsewhere in the 
Third World. Achieving the lower-bound population projections 
for 2100 with voluntary measures will be easier if those 
measures are implemented sooner rather than later, for 
population numbers carry from within their own momentum. With 
the probability— or even possibility— of major disruptions 
occasioned by a world of 14 or 15 billion, the enormous 
importance of such an investment becomes clear.
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